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S.F. Copp & A. Cronin1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Concerns over corporate behaviour in areas as seemingly disparate as homicide, 
manslaughter, bribery and tax evasion have led to experimentation with new models of 
corporate – as distinct from individual – criminality. The aim has been to avoid obstacles to 
prosecution posed by the common law’s identification principle, where an individual can be 
said to the company’s “directing mind and will”, that effectively limits prosecution to small 
companies. Foremost amongst these new models has been the “failure to prevent” model 
introduced by the Bribery Act 2010. This has been perceived to have been successful in 
changing corporate behaviour, with widespread adoption of new corporate practices 
evidencing that compliance is taken seriously. As a consequence, it has been proposed that 
this model be extended to other areas of behaviour regarded as economic crimes. HMRC 
warmly endorsed the model and the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which came into force on 
30 September 2017, contains new corporate tax offences relating to the failure to prevent UK 
and foreign tax evasion. In early 2017, the Ministry of Justice issued a “Call for Evidence on 
Corporate Liability for Economic Crime”, with particular reference to its proposal to create 
“failure to prevent” fraud, false accounting and money-laundering offences.  
 
The purpose of this series of two articles is to focus on whether the extension of the “failure 
to prevent” model, now employed in the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Finances Act 
2017, is likely to succeed in dealing with corporate fraud, especially in a financial services 
context.  In this first article we analyse: 
 
(a) The problem of “economic crime”;  
(b) The historical development of the “failure to prevent” model of organisational 
liability for bribery; and 
(c) Its relative effectiveness in the context of the Bribery Act 2010 and extension in the 
Criminal Finances Act 2017. 
  
This will exclude an examination of its applicability to other offences since these are distinct 
in substance and therefore merit separate investigation.  In the second article, “New Models 
of Corporate Criminality: The Problem of Corporate Fraud: Prevention or Cure?” we will 
evaluate the relative ineffectiveness of the existing law in combating fraud in a financial 
services context, the appropriateness of the “failure to prevent” model to “economic crime”, 
specifically fraud in a financial services context, and make proposals for reform. 
                                                          
1 Dr S.F. Copp, Associate Professor, and Dr A. Cronin, Senior Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, Bournemouth 
University. This article builds on the authors’ response to the Ministry of Justice “Call for Evidence on 
Corporate Liability for Economic Crime” submitted to the Ministry of Justice on 23 March 2017. The law is 
generally stated as at 22 January 2017.  
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THE PROBLEM OF “ECONOMIC CRIME” 
 
Growth in international and national scale 
 
Criminal activity involving companies, whether in terms of money-laundering, fraud, bribery 
or tax evasion seems increasingly unresponsive to traditional legal strategies and has grown 
to a scale incurring significant economic consequences. In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, evidence of misconduct is emerging that has never before “occurred so 
systematically, in such a scale and across multiple jurisdictions.” 2  
 
The estimates globally for money-laundering are truly eye-watering. According to a study of 
studies conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime the amounts available for money-
laundering in 2009 were equivalent to 3.6% of GDP or US$ 2.1 trillion3 with money flows 
relating to transnational organised crime activities equivalent to 1.5% of global GDP or US$ 
870 billion.4 Furthermore, 70% of these money flows would have been available for 
laundering through the financial system, equivalent to 1% of global GDP or US$ 590 billion.5 
The UK’s National Crime Agency believes that “many hundreds of billions of international 
criminal money is laundered through UK banks, including their subsidiaries, each year”.6 
HM Treasury and the Home Office see money-laundering as a key enabler of serious and 
organised crime, involving more broadly based measures of social and economic costs, 
estimated at £24 billion each year as well as a threat to national security.7 Reflecting perhaps 
the increasing priority attached to this issue, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
announced its largest penalty ever for a failure to maintain an adequate anti-money-
laundering control framework against Deutsche Bank AG, being a fine of just over £163 
                                                          
2 M. Shafik, Bank of England Deputy Governor, Markets and Banking, “From ‘ethical drift’ to ‘ethical lift’: 
Reversing the tide of misconduct in global financial markets” speech given at the panel discussion Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Conference on ‘Reforming Culture and Behaviour in the Financial Services Industry’ 
Oct. 20, 2016, at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx/Documents/speeches/2016/speech930.
pdf  [Accessed May 29, 2017].  See also the comments made by the European Parliament, Directorate General 
for Internal Policies, Policy Dept A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Consumer Protection Aspects of Financial 
Services (2014), IP/A/IMCO/ST/2013-07 Feb. 2014 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/507463/IPOL-
IMCO_ET(2014)507463_EN.pdf [Accessed May 29, 2017]. 
3 “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime: 
Research Report” (UNODC, October 2011), at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
4 “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime: 
Research Report” (UNODC, October 2011), at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017] pp.5-7. 
5 “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime: 
Research Report” (UNODC, October 2011), at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017] pp.5-7. 
6 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/money-laundering [Accessed May 5, 2017]. 
7 HM Treasury & Home Office, “UK national risk assessment of money-laundering and terrorist financing” (Oct. 
2015), p.3. This figure is dominated by the cost of drug-supply of £10.7 billion and fraud with a cost of £8.9 
billion, see p.19. The report acknowledges that less is known of the costs of cyber-crime and modern slavery. 
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million in January 2017.8 
 
The estimates for the amount of bribery and its costs, which may be very different, have 
become the subject of some controversy.9 Estimates indicate that the scale of the problem 
internationally has grown from $1.1 trillion in 2005 to between $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion in 
2015.10 The proportion of companies that have to pay bribes to win or retain business varies 
enormously globally, 15% in industrialised countries, 30% in Asia and 60% in former Soviet 
Union countries.11 The position in the UK is unclear; however, some idea of the potential 
scale of the problem may be shown by the record payment of £497.25 million plus interest 
and costs by Rolls-Royce plc under the terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement made 
with the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in 2017, following a four-year investigation into bribery 
and corruption, with the total paid out by Rolls-Royce being approximately £671 million 
when payments to the US and Brazil were taken into account.12 The costs of bribery are often 
indirect or concealed; as the Ministry of Justice has pointed out they may include: contracts 
not being specified or enforced properly, e.g. services not performed to the required standard 
or over-specified with unnecessary gold-plating; transaction costs may be higher; competition 
impaired; incentives to invest and innovate undermined; as well as serious reputational 
damage and strategic disruption if concerns arise.13 However, in the case of bribery, it has 
been argued that the new approach to imposing criminal liability in the Bribery Act 2010 has 
had a significant impact in addressing and perhaps reducing bribery in the UK. 
Equally eye-watering are the global estimates for fraud. PKF estimated that in 2013 the 
global loss from fraud might have cost an equivalent of £2.78 trillion, more than 50% greater 
than the UK’s entire GDP for the period.14 Examples of the sorts of areas where losses were 
found to have been measured were wide-ranging, whether in terms of sector, e.g. agriculture, 
construction, education and housing and in terms of activity e.g. compensation, payroll and 
procurement.15 Using the terminology employed in the Annual Fraud Indicator, Crowe 
Clarke Whitehill, Experian and the Portsmouth University Centre for Counter Fraud Studies 
believe that fraud alone is estimated to have cost16 the UK economy a staggering £190 billion 
                                                          
8 Financial Conduct Authority Final Notice to Deutsche Bank AG dated 30th Jan. 2017, at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/deutsche-bank-2017.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
9 See, for example, M. Stephenson “The Amount of Bribery and the Cost of Bribery are not the same”, The 
Global Anticorruption Blog (15.12.15). 
10 International Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note “Corruption: Costs and Mitigating Strategies” (May 
2016), p.5, citing D. Kaufman “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption” (Munich: MPRA Paper 8089) 
(2005) and an extrapolation by him in 2015 based on the earlier estimate. 
11 Transparency International UK, Corruption Data at http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption-data, cited 
by Ministry of Justice “Impact Assessment of bill on reform of the law on bribery” (Implementation stage, 
version 2), p.7. 
12 “SFO completes £497.25 million Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Rolls-Royce PLC”, SFO News Release 
17 Jan. 2017. 
13 Ministry of Justice, “Impact Assessment of bill on reform of the law on bribery”, (Implementation stage, 
version 2), p.7. 
14 J. Gee and M. Button, “The Financial Cost of Fraud 2015” (PKF and University of Portsmouth, 2015), p.10. 
15 J. Gee and M. Button, “The Financial Cost of Fraud 2015” (PKF and University of Portsmouth, 2015), p.7. 
16 This may be better expressed as a misallocation of resources. 
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in 2017,17 rising from £52 billion in 2013.18 This figure is more than the UK Government 
spends on health and defence combined and equates to circa £10,000 per family in the UK.19 
While the exponential leap in the amount estimated over that period may be explained more 
by other factors than by a particularly sharp increase in fraudulent activity itself,20 it is quite 
clear that fraud remains a widespread problem despite considerable legislative attention in the 
Fraud Act 2006. Beyond the quantifiable financial cost, there is also the documented social 
cost of economic crime: small businesses forced into bankruptcy, livelihoods ruined, jobs 
destroyed and opportunities lost, the inestimable impact on society and people’s health and 
well-being.21  
 
It may even be that the global estimates for fraudulent behaviour cited above grossly 
underestimate the full extent of fraudulent behaviour, acknowledging as they do frauds 
perpetrated against organisations but not necessarily those arguably committed by them. This 
is not a matter of criticism but simply reflects the different methodologies that may be 
employed in the selection and calculation of activities considered criminally fraudulent. The 
authors have addressed this issue elsewhere in terms of how addressing off-balance sheet 
finance as a matter of accounting regulation means that its potential categorisation as criminal 
fraud may be overlooked22. The impact of addressing other forms of misconduct as matters of 
financial services regulation may have similar effect. Accordingly, the 2017 Annual Fraud 
Indicator provides a comprehensive account of a number of types of fraud but does not refer 
to the various mis-selling cases that have pervaded the financial services industry.23 If put to 
the test in the criminal courts, many of the numerous mis-selling scandals that have hit the 
headlines over recent years, might perhaps be found to constitute fraud.24 On this basis, in 
                                                          
17 Crowe Clarke Whitehill, Experian and Portsmouth University Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, “Annual 
Fraud Indicator 2017” at https://www.croweclarkwhitehill.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/Annual-
fraud-indicator-2017.pdf [Accessed Jan 18, 2018].  
18 National Fraud Authority, 6 June 2013 at http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-fraud-
indicator--2 [Accessed May 21, 2017].   
19 Crowe Clarke Whitehill, Experian and Portsmouth University Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, “Annual 
Fraud Indicator 2017” at https://www.croweclarkwhitehill.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/Annual-
fraud-indicator-2017.pdf [Accessed Jan 18, 2018] p.5. 
20 For example, different methodologies for the reports and, in particular, the fact that there is no accepted 
definition of “fraud” which leaves the scope of the activities included in the reports open to variation. 
21 New City Agenda and Cass Business School, “Cultural Change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England, Practising 
What They Preach?”, 25 October 2016 at http://newcityagenda.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NCA-
Cultural-change-in-regulators-report_embargoed.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017] p.13. 
22 S. Copp and A. Cronin, “The failure of criminal law to control the use of off balance sheet finance during the 
banking crisis” (2015) 36 Company Lawyer (4) 99. 
23 Crowe Clarke Whitehill, Experian and Portsmouth University Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, “Annual 
Fraud Indicator 2017” at https://www.croweclarkwhitehill.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/Annual-
fraud-indicator-2017.pdf [Accessed Jan 18, 2018] which specifically includes tax fraud, NHS fraud, benefits 
fraud, vehicle excise fraud, TV licence fee fraud, blue badge fraud, retail and telecommunications fraud, 
council tax fraud, rail transport fraud, ID fraud against consumers, payroll fraud, procurement fraud, grants 
fraud, mortgage fraud, credit/debit card fraud, housing tenancy fraud, motor finance fraud, insurance fraud. 
24 The generic offence is contained in the Fraud Act 2006 and can be made out either through the making of a 
false or misleading representation, Fraud Act 2006, s.1(1)(2)(a) and s.2; or failing to disclose information that a 
person is legally obliged to disclose, Fraud Act 2006, s.1(1)(2)(b) and s.3; or by abusing a position occupied in 
relation to the financial interests of another, Fraud Act 2006, s.1(1)(2)(c) and s.4. If done dishonestly, Fraud Act 
2006, s.2(1)(a), s.3(a), s.4(1)(b), and with an intention to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause a loss 
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excess of £54 billion might be added to the estimated overall costs for the period since 2000, 
this figure representing the total in compensation paid out by the major retail banks and 
building societies in the UK in the 15 years since the turn of the millenium for mis-selling 
activities.25 In addition, further claims, estimated to amount to £33 billion, may result from 
the Supreme Court decision in Plevin v Paragon [2014] relating to the non-disclosure of 
sales commissions paid on these policies.26 Numerous other mis-selling complaints include 
interest rate hedging schemes, packaged accounts, interest only mortgages, investments and 
other insurance products.27 More recently, it has been suggested that liability for mis-selling 
pension annuities may prove to be as extensive as the personal protection insurance scandal.28 
 
Legal problems of attribution hinder criminal prosecution 
 
The common law’s approach to attributing criminal liability to companies, employing the so-
called “identification principle”, has posed serious difficulties. The common law foundation 
of criminal liability is traditionally expressed in the Latin maxim “actus non facit reum nisi 
mens sit rea”29 which essentially means that “whatever the deed a man may have done, it 
cannot make him criminally punishable unless his doing of it was actuated by a legally 
blameworthy attitude of mind”.30 Further, in accordance with the criminal law’s individualist 
ideal, the state of mind in question is determined subjectively rather than by reference to an 
objective standard of behaviour.31 A review of the means by which criminal culpability can 
be attracted in the context of corporate activity reveals various possibilities. In the first 
instance, an individual employee may commit the substantive offence in question and attract 
individual liability, for example under s. 1 Fraud Act32 for fraudulent activity of a proscribed 
type33 or s. 1, 2 or 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 for an offence of bribery, being bribed or 
bribing a foreign public official. The liability is contained at the individual level, whether or 
not the misconduct was intended to benefit the company, unless the individual actor involved 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to another or to expose another to a risk of loss, Fraud Act 2006, s.2(1)(b)(i) and (ii), s.3(b)(i) and (ii), s.4(1)(c)(i) 
and (ii). A conviction can follow with a term of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
25 New City Agenda and Cass Business School, “Cultural Change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England, Practising 
What They Preach?”, 25 October 2016 at http://newcityagenda.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NCA-
Cultural-change-in-regulators-report_embargoed.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
26 Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61. The Supreme Court held that the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974, ss.140A to 140D applied and the non-disclosure of the amount of commissions and the identity of 
the recipients did make the debtor-creditor relationship unfair under s.140A(1)(c) and the creditor may not 
have taken out the personal protection insurance had she known the amount of the commission charged.  
27 www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/speech/2013/CW-BILA-conference.pdf [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
28 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/11286965/Annuity-mis-selling-scandal-
could-it-be-as-big-as-PPI.html [Accessed May 21, 2017]. 
29 See, for example, Lord Kenyon CJ in Fowler v Padget (1798) 7 T.R. 509; Lord Goddard CJ in Harding v Price 
[1948] 1 K.B. 695. 
30 J.W. Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (Stevens & Sons, 1964) Vol. 1. 
31 A recent example of the subjectivist tendency can be found in the criminal damage case of R. v G. [2004] 1 
A.C. 1034 (HL) in which the objective test of recklessness was replaced in favour of a subjective test. 
32 Fraud Act 2006, s.1 and referring to ss.2, 3 and 4. 
33 In addition, if a business is carried out for a fraudulent purpose, statutory provisions impose liability under 
Companies Act 2006, s.993 and Fraud Act 2006, s.9 where an individual participates in a fraudulent business 
carried on by a sole trader.  
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is so senior in the organisation that he is deemed to be its controlling mind.34 In such a case, 
the company itself may also be criminally liable for the substantive offence under the 
“identification doctrine”. Application of this doctrine means that a corporation can be found 
guilty of a substantive offence, for example fraud contrary to s. 1 Fraud Act or one of the 
bribery offences set out at ss. 1, 2 and 6 Bribery Act, the mens rea, namely the dishonesty 
and/or relevant intent, of the senior individual being attributable to the corporate entity itself. 
Further, if liability is attributed to the company under this doctrine, other company officers 
may attract culpability for the offence if they have consented to or connived in its 
commission.35 As far as corporate liability is concerned, criminal culpability is restricted to 
cases in which the individual who is deemed to be the “directing mind and will” of the 
corporation, acting and speaking for it, is himself guilty of the offence.36  
 
The construction of corporate liability on this basis is now dated in that it is premised in a 
notion of corporations comprising relatively simple, pyramidal managerial frameworks. This 
means that large companies with typically complex organisational structures and 
decentralised responsibility are likely to evade prosecution whereas smaller companies, with 
directors more likely to be involved in the day to day activities of the business, are convicted 
much more readily.37 As a basis of fault, it can be said that the “identification principle” 
underestimates the complexity and subtlety of corporate action, imposing an already 
simplified biological model on an equally simplified appreciation of corporate management 
and behaviour.38 In practice, corporate policy and decision-making is often decentralised or 
the product of other corporate policies and procedures rather than the result of individual 
decisions.39 Indeed, the “identification principle” of liability attribution serves as a real 
incentive to senior managers to “turn a blind eye” to questionable or dubious practices and it 
acts as a disincentive for the internal reporting of suspected illegality.40 Therefore, as a 
method of attributing criminal liability, “it fails to reflect the reality of the modern day large 
multinational corporation (...) [and] it produces what many regard as an unsatisfactory narrow 
scope for criminal liability”.41 Furthermore, the need to identify the criminality of an 
individual of sufficient seniority, as a precursor to corporate prosecution, incurs evidential 
                                                          
34 Tesco v Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153 (HL). 
35 For example, directors, managers, secretaries or similar or persons purporting to act in any such capacity will 
be equally culpable if the offence is proved to have been committed with their consent or connivance, see 
Fraud Act 2006, s.12(2)(a) and (b) and Bribery Act 2010, s.14. 
36 This terminology is attributed to Viscount Haldane, Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] 
A.C. 705 (HL).  
37 See, for example, the prosecution of the small company in R. v Kite & OLL Ltd., 8 Dec 1994. T. Woolf, “The 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) - Towards a Realist Vision of Corporate Criminal Liability” (1997) Criminal Law 
Journal 257. See too, HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to 
prevent the facilitation of evasion” (Consultation document, 16 July 2015). 
38 C. Harding, Criminal Enterprise, Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility (Willan, 2007) Ch 9. 
39 C.M.V. Clarkson, ‘Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls’ [1996] Modern Law Review 557, 561. 
40 HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
of evasion”, (Consultation document, 16 July 2015). 
41 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 249, a view shared by 
Gobert, see J. Gobert, “Corporate Criminality: four models of fault” (1994) 14(3) Legal Studies 393, 395. 
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problems which inevitably increase as the size of the company increases.42 In the absence of 
the involvement of an actor whose mind is deemed to be that of the organisation itself, 
corporations have not been liable for the crimes perpetrated by their employees or agents in 
the course of business, even where the offending activity is to the benefit of the 
organisation.43 As a result of these limitations, bespoke statutory reforms have been enacted 
in relation to corporate manslaughter,44 bribery45 and tax evasion46 and reform is now 
proposed more broadly in other areas of economic crime. 
 
The first significant innovation, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007, introduced a distinct statutory basis for corporate liability where death arises as a 
consequence of a gross breach of the duty of care owed to the deceased by the organisation.47 
Subsequently, the Bribery Act 2010 imposed corporate criminal culpability on the basis of a 
failure of the organisation to prevent its employees or associated persons bribing another to 
the advantage of the organisation where there have been inadequate procedures in place to 
prevent the conduct.48 The Bribery Act therefore works in tandem to the common law 
“identification doctrine”, the new statutory “failure to prevent” model adding to the type of   
corporate culpability that may be incurred by imposing corporate liability for ineffective 
control of “rogue” employees.  
 
Government proposals for a new approach to “economic crime” 
 
In December 2014, the government published its UK Anti-Corruption Plan.49 Whilst this 
focused specifically on bribery, corruption,50 money laundering, and a number of highly 
particularised settings in which these crimes are perpetrated,51 Action 36 set out a 
                                                          
42 M. Hsaio, “Abandonment of the Doctrine of Attribution in favour of Gross Negligence Test in the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007” (2009) 30(4) Company Lawyer 110, 111. 
43 The need to find a “directing mind and will” with which to equate corporate blameworthiness is a relatively 
recent proposition emanating from the civil case of H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. 
[1957] 1 Q.B. 159 (CA) and followed in Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153 (HL). Prior to this authority existed 
for the application of established agency principles to corporate liability, see A. Cronin, “Reforming Corporate 
Fraud Regulation in the UK: A Model of Manifest Liability”, PhD thesis, Bournemouth University (Taylor Francis, 
2017, forthcoming) sub nom “Corporate Criminality and Liability for Fraud” and the analysis of Triplex Safety 
Glass Co Ltd. v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 395 (CA); R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] K.B. 551 
(CCA); Moore v Bresler Ltd. [1944] 2 All E.R. 515.   
44 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
45 Bribery Act 2010, s. 7. 
46 Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt. 3, ss. 45 and 46. 
47 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s.1. 
48 Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
49 HM Government “UK Anti-Corruption Plan”, (Dec. 2014). 
50 Although acknowledging there is no universally accepted definition of “corruption”, the UK Anti-Corruption 
Plan seems to accept that corruption is the abuse of power for personal gain, HM Government “UK Anti-
Corruption Plan”, (Dec. 2014) p.9. 
51 For example, organised crime, corruption in government departments and agencies, corruption, jury 
nobbling, corruption at borders, corruption by MPs, local authorities, the MOD, sports and betting, financial 
services and in the context of financial markets. The Plan also looks at money laundering and terrorism and the 
proceeds of crime, and generally at whistle-blowing provisions, HM Government “UK Anti-Corruption Plan” 
(Dec. 2014). 
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commitment to examine not only the case for a new offence of a corporate failure to prevent 
economic crime but also the rules on establishing corporate criminal liability more widely.52 
However, within just a year, on 28th September 2015, the Justice Minister, Andrew Selous, 
revealed that the Ministry of Justice had abandoned its work on corporate criminal liability 
for failure to prevent economic crimes.53 The reasons given for this decision were two-fold: 
first, there had been no corporate prosecutions to date for the Bribery Act offence of failing to 
prevent bribery and, second, there was little evidence of corporate economic wrongdoing 
going unpunished.54 Despite this seeming lack of confidence in the new model, on 16 July 
2015, HMRC proposed the introduction of a new corporate offence of failing to prevent the 
facilitation of offshore tax evasion by its agents.55 Starting in 2016 for the Crown 
Dependencies and Overseas Territories and in 2017 for the remaining signatory countries, 
HMRC will receive detailed information about offshore accounts held by UK tax residents 
under the Common Reporting Standards.56 The Finance Act 2016 introduced tougher 
sanctions with civil financial penalties and additional criminal offences for individual 
employees and/or associated persons who enable offshore tax evasion,57 which is now built 
upon by the corporate “failure to prevent” offences in relation to both UK tax and foreign tax 
evasion in the Criminal Finances Act 2017.58 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s (OECD) Global Forum for Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, currently with 140 members, provides the practical framework within 
which the offence will be constructed.59  In the meantime, the  failure to prevent economic 
crimes project has been resurrected by the Ministry of Justice, which on 12 May 2016 
announced that it would be consulting later in the year with a view to extending the “failure 
to prevent” model to fraud, false accounting and money-laundering.60  That call for evidence 
took place in early 2017, closing on the 24 March 2017.61 
 
The use of the terminology of “economic crime” to encompass issues of money-laundering, 
false accounting and fraud, whilst bribery and tax evasion are addressed under distinct 
measures, is to be regretted. There is a lack of logic using general terminology to cover 
money-laundering, false accounting and fraud whilst keeping other “economic” crimes, such 
as bribery and tax evasion, separate. It is submitted that the better solution would be to retain 
the status quo and reform the underlying legislation, for example, the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002, Terrorism Act 2000, Money-Laundering Regulations 2007 and Fraud Act 2006. 
                                                          
52 HM Government, “UK Anti-Corruption Plan” (Dec. 2014), p.14. 
53 https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/government-drops-plan-to-extend-corporate-criminal-
liability/5051277.article [Accessed June 6, 2017]. 
54 Ibid, the Bribery Act 2010, which set out the innovative offence in s. 7, had come force on July 1, 2011 and 
therefore more than 4 years had then elapsed. 
55 HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
of evasion” (Consultation document, 16 July 2015). 
56 This includes the name and address of the account holder, account numbers, interest and balances. 
57 Finance Act 2016, s.162 and Sch.20, s.166 inserting ss.106B to 106H into the Taxes Management Act 1970. 
58 Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt 3, ss.45 and 46. 
59 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ [Accessed May 9, 2017]. 
60 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-plans-to-tackle-corporate-fraud [Accessed June 26, 2016]. 
61 Ministry of Justice, “Call for Evidence on Corporate Liability for Economic Crime” 13 Jan. to 24 Mar. 2017, the 
responses to which are not yet published. 
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Furthermore, the use of the term “economic” poses the risk that the very real human costs 
associated with these crimes may fail to be appreciated, they may be perceived as purely 
“economic” and victimless in nature. To take money-laundering as an example, the human 
costs associated with the practice may well include modern slavery, human trafficking and 
terrorist atrocities. The consequences of fraud may be less visible but, as has been identified 
above, may nonetheless include inestimable damage to people’s health and well-being 
through bankruptcy and other factors. The use of the term “economic crime” may also pose 
the risk of policy creep over time; it conjures up unfortunate connotations in its application in 
the former Soviet Union.62  
 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE “FAILURE TO PREVENT” MODEL 
OF ORGANISATIONAL LIABILITY FOR BRIBERY 
The need to reform bribery law 
 
Given that bribery is a form of economic crime, it is of note that this particular offence was 
the subject of reform well in advance of the other forms now more generally identified. In 
this respect, the law of bribery is to be understood as the product of its genealogy, its origins 
and development wholly independent of the evolutionary paths of the law of fraud and other 
economic crimes. Bribery has also been treated in isolation at the international level and this 
distinction is reflected as much in the substance of the offence as in its enforcement63 and the 
drivers for reform. Cases involving an offence called bribery first appeared in Star Chamber 
records circa 1550.64 The common law offence of bribery of a public official sat alongside a 
number of other offences which prohibited conduct of this nature in highly particularised 
circumstances, for example misconduct in public office65 and misconduct by executive and 
administrative officials of the crown.66 Having evolved on a case by case basis, the common 
law offence of bribery of a public official encompassed the “receiving or offering [of] any 
undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in order to influence his 
behaviour in office, and incline him to act contrary the known rules of honesty and 
integrity.”67 As regards its scope, precedent existed for the bribing of privy councillors, 
officers of justice and jurymen68 and the elections of overseers of parishes, officers of 
companies and members of parliament.69 However, with the growth of commercial activity in 
                                                          
62 See, for example, “Economic Crimes under Soviet Law” (1951) University of Melbourne Res Judicata, 45. 
63 Dealt with below. 
64 J. Lindgren, “The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction” (1993) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141: 1695 and referring to J.T Noonan Jr’s comprehensive work, Bribes: The 
Intellectual History of A Moral Idea (Diane Publishing Co, 1984). 
65 The Law Commission is currently analysing responses to its second public consultation process with a view to 
proposed reform of this offence, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/misconduct-in-public-office/ [Accessed 
May 15, 2017]. 
66 See Law Commission, “Misconduct in Public Office, Issues Paper 1”, App. A, Jan 20, 2016, providing a 
detailed account of the historical developments of this offence and related offences. 
67 J.W.C. Turner, Russell on Crime (Stevens, 1964) p.381. 
68 The now defunct offence was referred to as embracery. 
69 W.F. Craies and H.D. Roome, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (24th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1910) p.1195. 
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was a corresponding increase in corrupt 
behaviour and the reach of the law was extended with the introduction of various statutory 
offences.70 The first, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, was enacted largely in 
response to the revelation of widespread misconduct of local government and other public 
employees within London’s governing body, the Metropolitan Board of Works.71 However, 
this statute did not address the growing problem of corruption in the private sector which was 
undermining confidence in trade and Parliament responded by passing the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1906.72 Criminalizing corruption between private individuals, the Act also 
extended the range of public officials who were caught by the law73 but was itself limited by 
the requirement that the recipient of the corrupt payment was the “agent” of a “principal”. 
The definition of “agent” was construed within the ordinary meaning of the term, applicable 
to those who acted on behalf of others, and therefore could include employees, directors and 
trustees.74 Within a decade, s. 4(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 extended the 
definition of “agent” in the public sector context such that a person serving under any public 
body, whether or not an agent within the accepted meaning, was deemed to be an agent for 
the purposes of the 1906 Act.75 Neither the 1889 Act76 nor the 1906 Act77 provided a 
definition of “corruptly”, an element that was central to the offending behaviour. In this 
respect, the courts relied upon the circular statement provided in Cooper v Slade (1858)78 to 
the effect that it meant purposefully doing an act which the law forbids as tending to corrupt. 
Unsurprisingly, this proved problematic in practice and the 1916 Act also created a rebuttable 
presumption of corruption where gifts were made to public officials by those seeking a 
contract from the public body.79  
 
Proposals for reform were put forward in the 1970’s following the Poulson scandal,80 the 
Radcliffe-Maud Committee recommending that the presumption of corruption should extend 
                                                          
70 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014).   
71 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
72 The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 came into force the following year. 
73 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
74 P. Murphy (ed.), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford University Press, 2003) B15.13. 
75 P. Murphy (ed.), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford University Press, 2003) B15.13. See also Barrett 
[1976] 1 W.L.R. 946. 
76 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, s.1(1) “Every person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction 
with any other person, corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive...” and s.1(2) “Every person who shall by 
himself or by or in conjunction with any other person corruptly give, promise or offer...”. 
77 Protection of Corruption Act 1906, s.1(1) “if any agent corruptly accepts or obtains..., or any person 
corruptly gives or agrees to give or offer...”. 
78 Cooper v Slade (1858) VI House of Lords Court (Clark’s) 746, 10 E.R. 1488 at 1499. 
79 Further to the enactment of Human Rights Act 1998, s.3 enshrining European Convention of Human Rights 
Art. 6(2), this shifts the evidential burden onto the defendant to raise the issue as to whether the gift was 
corruptly made, the burden of proof remaining with the prosecution. 
80 J. Poulson, architect, was convicted of conspiracy to make or receive corrupt gifts in a web of corruption 
extending to 23 local authorities and around 300 individuals including MPs, police officers, health authorities 
and civil servants, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/15/newsid_4223000/4223045.stm [Accessed May 
22, 2017]. 
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to cover elected officials who exercised discretion in areas such as housing and planning81 
and the Salmon Commission focusing on public sector issues.82 These were not acted upon 
and a further scandal, the infamous “cash for questions” affair involving Mohamed Al-Fayed, 
the then owner of Harrods department store, sparked John Major’s instigation of Lord 
Nolan’s Commission of Inquiry in 1994.83 It was at the suggestion of the Nolan Committee 
Report on Standards in Public Life84 that the Law Commission made proposals for reform of 
the bribery offence in 1998.85 However, the initial proposals were not adopted, largely due to 
the rejection of the proposed retention of the “agent” and “principal” basis for the offence86 
and reservations as to the alternatives that were subsequently mooted.87 Referring the matter 
back for further review, the Law Commission published another report in 200888 and it was 
this that led to the enactment of the Bribery Act 2010. 
 
A number of international initiatives were also emanating from various sources over this 
period and the domestic response to the problem of corruption and bribery must be viewed in 
this broader context. For example, as a member of the EU, the UK was subject to the First 
and Second Protocols to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ 
Financial Interests89 and the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials 
of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU Framework Decision 
of 22 July 2003.90 Similarly, the UK ratified the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption91 in December 2003 and this necessitated the criminalisation of 
both domestic and public foreign officials when it came into force in April 2004.92 In 
December 2005, the United Nations Convention against Corruption came into force 
following a series of resolutions, declarations and conventions and the launch of the Global 
Programme against Corruption.93 This was ratified by the UK in 2006, having signed up at an 
earlier high level conference in 2003.94 Further, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), to which the UK acceded in 1961, enacted the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 
                                                          
81 Radcliffe-Maud Committee on Local Government Rules of Conduct 1974. 
82 Royal Commission (The Salmon Commission) on Standards in Public Life 1976, Cmnd. 6524. 
83 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
84 Nolan Committee, Report on Standards in Public Life 1995 (Cm 28501). 
85 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (Report No. 248), 3 March 1998. 
86 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/notes [Accessed 16.10.16], see Summary, para.4. 
87 See the Government’s White Paper “Raising Standards and Upholding Integrity: the Prevention of 
Corruption” (Cm. 4759); Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill Session 2002-03, Report and Evidence HL 
157, HC 705 Dec 2003; The Government Reply to the Report from the Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption 
Bill Session 2002-03 HL 157, HC 705, Cm. 6068 and the Government consultation “Bribery: Reform of the 
Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO powers in cases of bribery of foreign officials” (2005). 
88 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Report No. 313), 20 Nov 2008. 
89 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33019 [Accessed May 22, 2017], the first 
protocol came into force on the 17 October 2002, the second on the 19 May 2009. 
90 R. Chada et al, Bribery: A Compliance Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014). 
91 Council of Europe, Treaty No. 173. 
92 http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Default_en.asp [Accessed May 22, 
2017]. 
93 See the details provided at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
94 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
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1999.95 In this respect, the OECD’S Working Group review of our national law found that 
the criminal law’s response to corporate liability was wanting96 and that although there were 
exceptions, our anti-corruption legislation was deficient in that it did not extend the 
jurisdiction of the UK courts to try cases abroad.    
 
Common law precedents for a “failure to prevent” model generally unsuccessful 
The failure to prevent the criminal activities of other persons has not generally been regarded 
as a criminal offence.97 There was a common law misdemeanour “misprision of felony”, 
involving a failure to reveal a felony to the authorities which in effect created a duty to reveal 
the commission of a crime. To attract liability it was not necessary to have done anything 
active in the commission of the offence,98 however, it was also a misprision to fail to reveal 
another’s intention to commit a future felony,99 which comes very close to an offence of 
failing to prevent a felony. Perhaps understandably, this offence was regarded as 
unreasonably wide for a considerable period of time100 such that it came to be regarded as 
“practically obsolete” in the nineteenth century.101 That being said, four prosecutions for the 
failure to report the felony of another were successful in the twentieth century, the last being 
in 1961.102 Although it had been suggested that the charge of misprision should only succeed 
on proof that the non-disclosure was for the benefit of the party charged,103 this was rejected 
in Wilde [1960].104 In Sykes [1961] Lord Denning accepted a number of limitations to 
prosecution for misprision, some of which were based on the nature of the relationship 
between the parties involved which could give rise to a claim of right in good faith, for 
example that between lawyer and client, doctor and patient and clergyman and parishioner.105 
In addition, the institutional writers identified it as a misdemeanour to forbear from 
preventing a felony, however, this was regarded as narrower in scope than misprision and 
                                                          
95 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [Accessed May 22, 2017]. Art.1 
criminalises the bribing of a foreign public official, Art.9 deals with mutual legal assistance and Art.10 with 
extradition. 
96 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/34599062.pdf  [Accessed May 22, 2017], 
pp.63 – 66. 
97 It is still a common law offence to refuse to assist a constable who calls for assistance in dealing with a 
breach of the peace, Brown (1841) Car & M 314; Waugh (1976) Times, 1 Oct. 1976. 
98 Sykes v DPP [1961] 3 W.L.R. 371 (TAC), a person committed an offence if he knew of another’s guilt, and 
could give information that might lead to his arrest for a felony, but omitted to communicate that information 
to some justice of the peace, see JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 1966). 
99 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.423.   
100 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.423, citing the Criminal Law 
Commissioners 5th Rep (184) Parl. Pap. xx 36. 
101 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.424, citing Stephen, HCL ii 238. 
102 Casserley, Times, May 28, 1938; Aberg [1948] 1 All E.R. 601, 32 CAR 144 (CCA); Wilde [1960] Criminal Law 
Review 116; Sykes v DPP [1961] 3 W.L.R. 371 (TAC). 
103 Aberg [1948] 1 All ER 601 and Lord Goddard’s reference to Lord Westbury in Williams v Bayley (1866) L.R. 1 
HL 220. 
104 Wilde [1960] Criminal Law Review 116. 
105 Sykes v DPP [1961] 3 W.L.R. 371 (TAC). 
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was long regarded as obsolete.106 The offence of misprision of felony, but not misprision of 
treason,107 was finally abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967 which also brought to an end 
the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours, a distinction that had played a 
fundamental part in determining the scope of criminal liability for the misprision offence. The 
Criminal Law Revision Committee report of 1965, upon which the statute was based, had 
rehearsed a number of concerns with the misprision offence.108 The Committee noted that the 
offence had no clearly defined limitations and, in particular, dishonesty was not a prerequisite 
to a conviction for the omission to report a felony. In addition, it was suggested that public 
opinion was unlikely to support an offence of refusing to answer police questions about the 
commission of offences and it then rejected the imposition of a general duty to disclose “for 
obvious reasons”.109 Although not clarifying what those obvious reasons were, it has been 
suggested that this approach was based on the criminal law’s general dislike of liability based 
on omissions, a principle that had been cogently argued in the context of rescuers and the 
failure to save or attempt to save those in peril.110 This argument was founded primarily on 
the incursion into the individual’s autonomy and liberty that such a duty would pose, noting 
that liability of this nature could arise by chance rather than choice. While supporters of 
social responsibility might have reasoned that a duty to disclose information is a minimal 
interference in comparison, the framers of the Criminal Law Act 1967 nonetheless followed 
the Law Committee’s recommendations.   
 
In other contexts, there have been limited instances in which the common law, in effect, 
imposed criminal liability on individuals for a failure to prevent another’s offending but, 
where it has done so, the construction of the liability incurred is as an accessory to the 
substantive offence.111 For example, a jury could infer that a mother intended to encourage or 
assist the sexual assault on her 12 year old son when she failed to prevent him from having 
sexual intercourse with an adult woman. The mother’s liability was based on her present 
knowledge of her son’s age and that he was unable to consent to the act.112 Similarly, in 
Carter v Richardson [1974] the supervisor of a learner-driver who was above the blood-
alcohol limit was found to have aided and abetted the drink-driving offence because he was 
aware that the driver had consumed excessive alcohol or was reckless as to whether he had 
done so.113 However, the application of this construction to establish a corporate accessorial 
liability, under the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 or the Serious Crime Act 2007, is 
problematic in that proof of some blameworthy mental state, intention, knowledge or 
                                                          
106 G. Williams, Criminal Law, General Part (Stevens & Sons, 1961) p.422 citing Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 557-558 
(CCR). 
107 D. Ormerod, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford University Press, 2017) A1.16. 
108 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Seventh Report on Felonies and Misdemeanours (1965) (Cmnd. 2659) 
para.39. 
109 S. Wallerstein, “Imposing Obligations to Disclose Information on Non-Suspects” in G.R. Sullivan and I. 
Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).   
110 S. Wallerstein, “Imposing Obligations to Disclose Information on Non-Suspects” in G.R. Sullivan and I. 
Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).   
111 See for example the discussion by D.J. Baker in G. William’s Textbook of Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2015) p.610-12. 
112 State v Ainsworth (1993) 426 S.E. 2d 410. 
113 Carter v Richardson [1974] R.T.R. 314. 
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recklessness, is required. Aside from the statutory exceptions found in relation to corporate 
manslaughter,114 the failure to prevent bribery115 and tax evasion116 the common law will 
only impose corporate culpability if the substantive offence in question has been committed 
by a sufficiently senior controlling officer within the organisation.117 Therefore, in order to 
attribute secondary liability to a corporation in this way, it would be necessary to find that an 
individual senior manager/director had been criminally complicit through aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring another to commit the crime or in the assisting or encouraging of 
it.118   
 
Statutory intervention to impose organisational liability based on failure to act 
 
Modern legislation has imposed a criminal liability for failure to disclose information in two 
key areas. The first relates to acts of terrorism or its funding, for example, under sections 19 
and 21A Terrorism Act 2000, and the second relates to knowledge or suspicion of money 
laundering under sections 330, 331 and 332 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.119 Application of 
the latter is confined specifically to persons working in the regulated sector where the 
defendant knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that another 
is engaged in money laundering.120 In essence, this imposes a duty to report and the 
“reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting” limb means that a conviction can be based 
on a finding that although the defendant did not suspect laundering activity, he should have 
done. This duty was underpinned by the higher standard of diligence imposed by the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007, now superseded and subtly amended by the Money 
Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017,121 which required comprehensive preventative systems within the 
regulated sector. The offences contained in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007122 began 
to get closer to a “failure to prevent” model by requiring that “relevant persons”123 who are 
acting in the course of business conducted by them in the UK take appropriate steps to detect 
and prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.124 In terms of the duty this 
imposed, there is a specific requirement to put in place and apply “customer due diligence” 
measures with an accompanying duty to effect internal controls, training and monitoring 
systems that are appropriate to the business in question, determined on a risk-based approach, 
                                                          
114 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s.1. 
115 Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
116 Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt.3, ss.45 and 46 
117 Tesco v Natrass [1972] A.C. 153 (HL). 
118 See the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s.8 and the Serious Crime Act 2007, ss.44-46. 
119 The 2002 Act came into force on February 24, 2003 and money laundering activity taking place prior to its 
commencement is subject to prosecution under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for non-drugs offences or the 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 for property derived from drugs offences. 
120 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss.330, 331, 332. 
121 S.I. 2017, No 692, in effect from 26 June 2017. 
122 S.I. 2007, No 2157, in accordance with the EU 3rd Money Laundering Directive 2005, to be superseded by 
the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2015/849 which took effect on 26 June 2015, supplemented by 
the Reg. (EU) 2016/675 of 14 July 2016, which was transposed into national law on 26 June 2017. 
123 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, reg.3. 
124 D. Ormerod, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2015), B21.32 emphasis added. 
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and to report suspicious activities. Non-compliance gave rise to a civil penalty125 and the 
offence is committed if the relevant person and/or regulated business fails to comply with one 
of the specified duties126 although there was a defence that the accused took all reasonable 
steps and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the regulatory offence.127 The 
corporate criminal behaviour is therefore the failure to comply with the detailed 
administrative requirements stipulated in the Regulations, this being the substantive offence. 
Accordingly, to describe the offence in terms of the failure to prevent money laundering 
affords considerable artistic licence as regards the specific underlying basis for the attribution 
of fault. Indeed, veering to the other extreme, the Financial Conduct Authority’s (“FCA”) 
recent report of Barclays’ failure to comply with the enhanced due diligence requirements,128 
in a £1.88bn transaction undertaken for a number of politically exposed persons, described 
the conduct as a failure to “minimise a risk that it might be used to facilitate financial 
crime”129 while the popular press described a record fine “for secret deals with mega-rich”, 
omitting any express reference to money-laundering or the Regulations themselves.130 The 
2007 Money Laundering Regulations continue to apply where the conduct constituting an 
offence under one of those regulations began before the date on which the new Regulations 
came into force, that being the 26 June 2017. While the new approach includes a general 
obligation to establish adequate and appropriate policies, controls and procedures to prevent 
money laundering and terrorist financing, there is no direct reference to a duty to take steps to 
detect this behaviour.131 Although this would appear to be implicit in the due diligence 
requirements, it is not clear whether the draftsmen intended to omit this specific obligation.  
 
As regards the duty to disclose, it is suggested that this is legitimated by the fact that those 
who are under the duty, i.e. who work in the regulated sector, actively help, even if 
unknowingly, to launder money and they are in a special relationship which gives rise to 
concerns of conflicts of interests.132 Accordingly, legislation and regulation in this area seek 
to strike a balance between the duties owed to the client and those owed to the state133 while 
giving effect to EU law.134 However, it must be remembered that liability for failure to 
disclose the offence of another and liability for the failure to prevent the commission of an 
offence by another are ontologically distinct. While the former imposes a responsive and 
                                                          
125 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, reg.42. 
126 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, regs.45 and 47. 
127 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, regs.45(4) and 47. 
128 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, reg.14(1). 
129 http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-barclays-72-million-for-poor-handling-of-financial-crime-risks 
[Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
130 Daily Mail, 27 Nov., 2015. 
131 See the commentary provided by David Ormerod and David Perry, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 
2018), B21.34.  
132 S. Wallerstein, “Imposing Obligations to Disclose Information on Non-Suspects” in G.R. Sullivan and I. 
Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).   
133 S. Wallerstein, “Imposing Obligations to Disclose Information on Non-Suspects” in G.R. Sullivan and I. 
Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).   
134 S.I. 2007, No 2157, in accordance with the EU 3rd Money Laundering Directive 2005, to be superseded by 
the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2015/849 which took effect on 26 June 2015, supplemented by 
the Reg. (EU) 2016/675 of 14 July 2016, which must be transposed into national law by 26 June 2017. 
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arguably minimal obligation on the duty holder to report to the relevant authority, by 
comparison the latter imposes a potentially onerous duty to actively construct such 
prophylactic measures as may be considered reasonable in the circumstances.   
 
The development of the “failure to prevent” model for bribery 
 
The Law Commission’s 2008 Report on Reforming Bribery naturally acknowledged both 
national and international obligations and influences.135 It recognised that the creation of a 
new criminal offence incurred a heavy burden of justification, which it sought to meet in the 
following way.136 It concluded that the criminal law needed strengthening in preference to 
modifying the civil law because an actionable damage may not be suffered when bribery is 
committed137. This finding directly reflected the OECD’s requirement that criminal liability 
be imposed where there is no effective “tort” of bribery or special administrative sanction 
aimed at its prevention.138 Of course, there are considerable limitations to bringing any civil 
action for this type of activity in English law which are primarily consequent on the 
construction of the wrongdoing itself and context in which it takes place, typically within the 
tight confines of an agency or fiduciary relationship. Accordingly, the civil law recognises 
that a principal may suffer an actionable loss as a result of his agent’s breach of fiduciary 
duty or his unjust enrichment. Of note, the giving or the receiving of a bribe is not a distinct 
“tort” in itself, but is one of any number of different activities that could compromise the 
fiduciary duty or give rise to an unjust enrichment.139 Although the fiduciary duties 
themselves are prophylactic in nature, there must be an identifiable and quantifiable loss for a 
claim of this nature to be actionable and, while the value of the secret commission itself may 
be readily established, quantifying the extent of the loss caused by the fraud is inevitably 
fraught with difficulty. Similarly, although liability for conduct of this type may be extended 
to third parties, this would need to be established on the basis of an unlawful means 
conspiracy involving proof of an agreement to some active or passive concerted action to 
cause damage140 to another by unlawful means.141 Accordingly, persons with locus standi to 
bring a civil action for bribery are strictly limited to those who have suffered a demonstrable 
direct financial loss, identified targets of an unlawful means conspiracy and/or those to whom 
injury was reasonably foreseeable in the course of the agreed activity. With the latter 
constraint in mind, the Law Commission concluded that a corporation, and those acting on its 
behalf, are better placed to ensure that the damage done by tolerating bribery is reduced or 
eliminated worldwide – especially in relation to overseas trade.142 
                                                          
135 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008).  
136 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.13. 
137 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.13. 
138 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.68. 
139 Petrotrade Inc v Smith [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 486, [2000] C.L.C. 916. 
140 This can be an intention to cause damage to the target or where it is reasonably foreseeable that injury will 
be caused. 
141 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No. 2) [1982] Ch. 204 (CA). Of note, a corporate body can 
also be a party to such a conspiracy and this liability can be imposed on the basis of Nelsonian knowledge / 
wilful blindness, Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs v Sunico A/S [2013] E.W.H.C. 941 (Ch). 
142 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.14. 
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Militating further towards the invocation of a criminal liability, the Law Commission also 
observed that the ambition of the EU Conventions was not adequately reflected in the civil 
jurisdiction, where the aim of the law of tort is primarily to restore parties to the financial 
position they were in before the loss.143 The Law Commission also rejected the possibility 
that minority shareholders could bring an action against the corporate tolerance of unethical 
practice, referring to potential obstacles and the lack of evidence that actions of this nature 
are, or could be, used effectively to hold company Boards to account.144 Thus, to accord with 
the spirit of our international obligations, the UK needed to adopt a more preventative 
approach by providing an enhanced means of deterrence and punishment to companies 
indifferent to the commission of bribery.145 Further, the preference for criminalization over 
regulation was underlined by reference to the character of the misconduct in question, 
contrasting “parking offences, many environmental or licensing offences, and offences 
connected with, for example, failures to file accounts in a particular form” as examples of 
regulatory offences.146 Providing further elucidation, the Law Commission opined that 
regulatory offences often target conduct that involves no harm in itself but which is 
conducive to harmful, risky or wrongful outcomes, for example parking on a double yellow 
line.147 In support, three of the four consultees who responded did not believe that regulation 
enforced by non-criminal sanctions was the best way to address lack of corporate 
supervision.148   
 
THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FAILURE TO PREVENT MODEL IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 AND ITS EXTENSION IN THE 
CRIMINAL FINANCES ACT 2017 
 
Structure of legislation 
 
The common law bribery offence and the patchwork of statutory provisions were repealed 
when the Bribery Act 2010 came into force on 1 July 2011. Although the Act retains the 
distinctions between active and passive bribery,149 liability is not limited by reference to the 
particular status of the individuals involved and is determined by nature of the consequent act 
or that intended. Accordingly, the offer and/or acceptance of the advantage, financial or 
other, are deemed criminal bribery if done with an intention that the recipient will perform a 
                                                          
143 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.67. 
144 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.68. 
145 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008). There are 4 European Conventions requiring liability for bribery 
and an inadequate failure to supervise an employee (or other person) who has committed bribery:  Art.3(2) 
Second Protocol of the Convention on the Protection of the European Community’s Financial Interests; 
Art.18(2) Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; Art.5(2) European Council’s Framework 
Decision 2003/568/JHA; OECD Antibribery Convention.  
146 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.17. 
147 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.18. 
148 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008), para.6.70. 
149 Criminalized at Bribery Act 2010, ss.1 and 2 respectively. 
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relevant function or activity improperly.150 The territorial limitation is addressed by s. 6 
which specifically criminalises the bribery of a foreign public official and corporate 
responsibility is set out at s. 7 with the failure to prevent bribery offence. The Bribery Act 
“failure to prevent” offence,151 with the accompanying adequate procedures/due diligence 
defence,152 is, however, very different to previous common law attempts to develop liability 
based on a failure to prevent criminal acts and can instead be seen quite simply as the 
application of a well-established model of regulatory liability that developed in parallel. It is 
also very different to the failure-based offences in the Money Laundering Regulations in that 
it does not turn on a failure to comply with a detailed framework of administrative measures 
but is framed specifically on the failure to prevent an employee or associate committing the 
substantive bribery offence.153 Further, in relation to the corporate bribery offence, the 
company itself must determine what internal procedures need to be invoked in order meet the 
adequacy test for prevention encompassed in the statutory “due diligence” defence, there are 
no explicitly prescribed measures.154 The novelty of the Act therefore lies in the creation of a 
serious corporate offence combined with a defence that is effectively the demonstration of 
regulatory-type compliance, this construction now blurring the criminal and the regulatory 
categories in a penal statute.155   
 
Evaluation of the Bribery Act 2010 
 
Five years on, there are mixed messages as to whether the Bribery Act is proving a success.  
For example, some commentators have described a “step change in anti-bribery compliance 
standards”156 and note that, in spite of predictions that UK companies would be seriously 
disadvantaged on the global stage, the UK economy is the strongest in Europe.157 Similarly, 
in terms of awareness and impact of the new provisions, a survey conducted in January 2014 
found that 66% of SMEs had either heard of the Bribery Act 2010 or were aware of its 
corporate liability for failure to prevent bribery, with that awareness increasing slightly 
among those exporting to less developed regions, including the Middle East, Asia, Africa and 
South and Central America.158 Of the 66% aware of the Act, 81% knew that the Act has 
                                                          
150 Bribery Act 2010, s.3. 
151 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(1). 
152 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(2). 
153 Bribery Act 2010, s.1 or s.6. 
154 Bribery Act 2010, s.7(2).  As regards guidance in relation to this matter see 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
155 S. Gentle, “The Bribery Act 2010” [2011] Criminal Law Review 101. 
156 http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/april/five-years-ofn-the-bribery-act-has-led-to--a-step-change-
in-anti-bribery-compliance-standards-says-expert/ [Accessed May 22, 2017], by B. Vitou, an anti-bribery expert 
at Pinsent Masons, LLP. 
157 https://www.icsa.org.uk/ireland/knowledge-and-guidance/governance-and-directors/report-on-awareness-
and-impact-of-the-uk-bribery-act-2010-among-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-published [Accessed May 
22, 2017]. 
158 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, which became the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy in July 2016) and the Ministry of Justice, “Report on awareness and impact of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 among small and medium sized enterprises”, 25 Sept. 2015, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010-on-smes [Accessed May 22, 
2017]. 
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extra-territorial reach and 72% thought that their company had sufficient understanding to be 
able to implement adequate anti-bribery procedures.159 Impressive as this may sound, put 
another way it meant that less than half of the SMEs surveyed had enough knowledge to take 
sufficient steps some two and half years after the Act came into force. Of some concern is the 
report published in October 2016 by Professor Kakabadse, Henley Business School, which 
suggests that bribery is a “way of life” for British companies working in emerging markets, 
with an estimated 85% of managers forced to resort to it in order to do business, often with 
the tacit permission of their chief executives.160 While acknowledging that the robust 
penalties contained in the UK Bribery Act and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “bring 
fear to boards”, he suggested that they are also creating a new class of “fall guys”. These 
findings, based on a 12-year inquiry comprising of “intimate discussions” with over 900 
executives,161 are in contrast to other recent reports which indicate an increased awareness of 
bribery which may be attributable to the numerous high-profile corruption cases involving 
major US and European corporations162 or the recent corporate investigations which are 
being undertaken by the Serious Fraud Office in the UK. According to the report published 
by PWC as a part of its Global Crime Survey 2016,163 UK respondents reported that the 
overall level of bribery and corruption has fallen since 2014 with 98% stating that their 
company’s management were clear in their condemnation of the practice, and 94% believing 
that their company would rather have a business transaction fail than resort to bribery to 
secure it.164 On a global perspective, the outlook is less optimistic with Ernst & Young’s 
report showing no improvement since 2014 and 39% of those surveyed perceiving that 
bribery is widespread in their countries. In the emerging markets this equated to 51% of 
respondents thinking that bribery occurs widely and in the developed markets 21% reported 
that such behaviour is widespread.   
  
Notwithstanding, the perception of a high incidence of corrupt behaviour in both developed 
and emerging markets, there has been just one conviction for the corporate offence of failure 
                                                          
159 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, which became the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy in July 2016) and the Ministry of Justice, “Report on awareness and impact of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 among small and medium sized enterprises”, 25 Sept. 2015, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010-on-smes [Accessed May 22, 
2017]. 
160 See the media reports at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/26/bribery-a-way-of-life-for-
companies-operating-in-emerging-market/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]; 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d44e6b4f-df0f-409f-ab82-b73654b1fdc7 [Accessed May22, 
2017]. 
161 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/26/bribery-a-way-of-life-for-companies-operating-in-
emerging-market/ [Accessed May 22, 2017];  http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d44e6b4f-df0f-
409f-ab82-b73654b1fdc7 [Accessed May22, 2017]. 
162 For example in the Ernst & Young Global Fraud Survey 2016 and commenting in particular on the worsening 
view in developed markets, at http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/assurance/fraud-investigation---dispute-
services/ey-global-fraud-survey-2016 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
163 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/consulting/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html [Accessed 
May 22, 2017]. 
164 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/consulting/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html [Accessed 
May 22, 2017]. 
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to prevent bribery165 to date and three Deferred Prosecution Agreements.166 Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPA) became part of the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) 
enforcement armoury in February 2014 and can be invoked, with judicial approval, once 
criminal proceedings have been instituted against a corporation. In essence, the effect is that 
the prosecution is deferred on terms, such as the payment of a financial penalty, 
compensation and the implementation of a compliance programme. If the terms of the 
agreement are met within the specified time, the proceedings are discontinued.167 Further, in 
October 2014 sentencing guidelines on financial penalties for companies convicted of 
economic crimes came into force and these will also inform the level of any financial penalty 
that forms part of a DPA.168 Thus, for example, in February 2016, Sweett Group PLC was 
fined £1.4m on conviction169 and, in November 2015, Standard Bank was given a US Dollar 
16.8m fine as a term of its DPA.170  
 
The lack of prosecutions for the s. 7 corporate failure to prevent bribery to date is not 
necessarily indicative of particularly low incidents of economic crime of this nature. It must 
be remembered that the Bribery Act 2010 came into force just over 5 years ago, does not 
have retrospective effect and the corporate model of criminal liability it employs is an 
innovation lacking any equivalent in the earlier anti-bribery regime. The provisions can only 
be invoked for failures occurring since July 2011. Accordingly, in January 2016, in the case 
referred to as “chickengate”, Smith & Ouzman Ltd. was convicted of 3 counts of corruption 
but, because the bribes had taken place between November 2006 and December 2010, this 
was prosecuted under s. 1(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.171 This corporate 
                                                          
165 Sweett Group PLC pleaded guilty to the corporate offence on 18 Dec. 2015, contrary to Bribery Act 2010, 
s.7. 
166 On 30 Nov. 2015, Sir B. Leveson approved the first DPA between the Serious Fraud Office and ICBC Standard 
Bank Plc for acting with its sister company, Stanbic Bank Tanzania Ltd. to bribe Tanzanian government officials, 
see for example the report by Ashurst LLP on Global ABC and investigations, 18 Jan. 2016 at 
https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=12763 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. The second DPA was 
approved on July 8, 2016, also by Leveson LJ, the counterparty is a UK SME that cannot be named because of 
ongoing related legal proceedings and is therefore referred to as XYZ Ltd, see  
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/08/sfo-secures-second-dpa/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]. The third DPA was 
agreed on Jan. 17, 2017 with Rolls Royce, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/01/17/sfo-completes-497-25m-
deferred-prosecution-agreement-rolls-royce-plc/ [Accessed May 16, 2017]. A fourth DPA was agreed on Apr. 
10, 2017 between the SFO and Tesco Stores Ltd but the details of the criminal activity to which this relates are 
currently the subject of reporting restrictions, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/04/10/sfo-agrees-deferred-
prosecution-agreement-with-tesco/ [Accessed May 16, 2017]. 
167 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sch.17 and The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, Pt.11. 
168 https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Fraud_bribery_and_money_laundering_offences_-_Definitive_guideline.pdf [Accessed May 
22, 2017]. 
169 With an additional £851, 152.23 confiscated and £95,031.97 ordered in costs, 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/02/19/sweett-group-plc-sentenced-and-ordered-to-pay-2-3-million-after-
bribery-act-conviction/ [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
170 It also had to pay back the bribe of US $6million plus interest, disgorge the profit of $8.4million and pay the 
SFO’s legal costs. See https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2015/11/30/sfo-agrees-first-uk-dpa-with-standard-bank/ 
[Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
171 http://www.printweek.com/print-week/news/1148334/smith-ouzman-denies-paying-gbp400k-bribes-
chickengate [Accessed May 22, 2017]. The case became known as “chickengate” because of the frequency 
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conviction, the first for offences involving bribery of foreign public officials, would have 
been established through the longstanding common law identification principle, with both the 
Chairman and the Sales and Marketing Director having been found guilty of the offences.172  
Similarly, investigations of this nature are inevitably long-running. The Smith & Ouzman 
case, for example, was concluded in January 2016 having been opened in October 2010, the 
first hearing not taking place until some 3 years later, in October 2013. The same can be said 
even in cases where the defendant organisation self-reports to the SFO. Thus, for example, 
where Sweett Group Plc had self-reported in July 2014, it was not until some 17 months later, 
on the 18 December 2015, that a guilty plea was finally entered.173 Although the company 
had invited the involvement of the SFO, it appears that the company ceased to be considered 
co-operative on the basis that, following legal advice, it had continued to undertake its own 
independent investigation.174 However, in the Standard Bank case, where the defendant 
company was seen to co-operate sufficiently to be granted a DPA on 30 November 2015, the 
self-referral had been made after suspicions were raised in March 2013, some 2 years and 8 
months earlier.   
 
While only 2 corporate proceedings had been brought under the Bribery Act 2010 by the end 
of 2015, the SFO had opened 16 new investigations that year and there are currently a 
number of ongoing inquiries which relate to activity preceding and post-dating the coming 
into force of the Bribery Act 2010. These include ABB, Airbus Group, Amec Foster Wheeler, 
BAT, Chemring, ENRC, FH Bertling, KBR, Petrofac, Rio Tinto and Unaoil.175 Perhaps 
indicative of the growing appetite for robust anti-bribery action, in May 2015 the 
International Corruption Unit was created as part of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan with a view 
to a significant increase in investigations and a higher likelihood of prosecution.176 The UK 
Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022 builds upon this.177 It is reasonable to expect that the 
increasing publicity of investigative actions and enforcement measures being taken, in 
increasingly high-profile corporate cases, will continue to diminish the knowledge and 
awareness deficit that has been identified in relation to the anti-bribery offences. Publicity 
will also serve to illustrate, as it did in the Standard Bank proceedings, that a purely tick-box 
approach to corporate anti-bribery and corruption policy is not enough to demonstrate that 
due diligence has been exercised and to avoid penalty.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with which “chicken” as a pseudonym for “bribe” was used in the correspondence relied upon in evidence at 
trial. 
172 https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2014/12/22/uk-printing-company-two-men-found-guilty-corruption-trial/ 
[Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
173 See the discussion in Ashurst LLP, “Bribery and corruption; what now for 2016?”, 18 Jan. 2016 at 
https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=12763 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
174 https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=12763 [Accessed May 22, 2017]. 
175 https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-cases/ [Accessed Jan 18, 2018]. 
176 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime/international-corruption-
unit-icu [Accessed May 22, 2017]. This combined the remits of the Metropolitan Police Proceeds of Corruption 
Unit, the City of London Police Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit and elements of the National Crime Agency 
Economic Crime Command. 
177 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/667221/6_3323_Anti-
Corruption_Strategy_WEB.pdf/ [Accessed Jan 22, 2018]. 
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The “failure to prevent” model not only side-steps the problematic attribution of corporate 
fault inherent in the identification doctrine, the placing of the evidential onus on the corporate 
defendant to show due diligence also goes a long way to overcome practical difficulties that 
are particularly exacerbated in the corporate context. The problem of evidence is further 
alleviated with the availability of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, and accompanying 
opportunity for a reduction in penalty, which serves as a strong incentive to self-report when 
companies discover that their anti-bribery regime has been ineffective. 
Further development of model in the Criminal Finances Act 2017 
The corporate offence for failure to prevent offshore tax evasion introduced by the Criminal 
Finances Act 2017 goes further than the model in the Bribery Act in two important 
respects.178 First, the substantive bribery offence is committed by the employee of, or person 
associated with, the commercial organisation itself and the imposition of corporate culpability 
for “failure to prevent” rests on a 2-step process. In contrast, corporate liability for failure to 
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion is premised on a substantive offence being committed 
by a client of the firm and requires a 3-step process. In the first step, it must be established 
that there is a substantive criminal offence committed at taxpayer level, for example the 
common law crime of cheating the public revenue, or conspiracy to do so, or one of the range 
of statutory fraudulent evasion offences.179 The second step requires that a person associated 
with the company, acting in his professional capacity, has criminally facilitated the taxpayer’s 
evasion of tax. This may be any offence pursuant to which a person is knowingly concerned, 
for example the fraudulent evasion of income180 or other form of tax, or dishonestly taking 
“steps with a view” to tax evasion,181 or through established “aiding,  abetting, counselling or 
procuring” principles of secondary criminal liability.182 The  consequential corporate liability 
is predicated on the third step of proof of substantive criminal activity by both the taxpayer 
and the associated person providing services for or on behalf of the corporation, though 
neither the prosecution nor the conviction of either individual are prerequisites. In this 
respect, HMRC’s stated policy is to deal with fraud by using Civil Investigation of Fraud 
procedures, preferring the encouragement of full and honest voluntary disclosure under 
Contractual Disclosure Facility arrangements and the subsequent imposition of civil 
penalties.183 From 1 January 2017, the civil penalties were extended to enablers of the 
offshore tax evasion.184 
 
                                                          
178 Compare Criminal Finances Act 2017, Pt 3, ss.45 and 46 with Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
179 See, for example, Value Added Tax Act 1994, s.72; Taxes Management Act 1970, s.106A or ss.106B to 106H 
as inserted by Finance Act 2016, s.166. 
180 Finance Act 2000, s.144. 
181 See, for example, Value Added Tax Act 1994, s.72 and the Taxes Management Act 1970, s.106A, which 
make it an offence to dishonestly “take steps with a view to” or be “knowingly concerned in” the evasion. 
182 HMRC, “Tackling tax evasion: Government guidance for the corporate offence of failure to prevent the 
criminal facilitation of tax evasion”, Draft Government Guidance, Oct. 2016; Criminal Finance Act 2017, 
ss.45(4) and 45(5).  
183 HMRC, “Code of Practice 9, HM Revenue and Customs investigations where we suspect tax fraud”, June 
2014. 
184 Finance Bill 2016, s.162 and Sch.20. Penalties can be incurred of up to 100% of the tax they helped to evade 
or £3,000, whichever is the highest. 
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In that a finding of corporate liability for “failure to prevent” does not rest on criminal action 
being taken in relation to the underlying substantive tax offences of the taxpayer and the 
enabler, this approach accords with that taken to criminal liability for a corporate failure to 
prevent bribery.  However, given the shift from a 2-step to a 3-step approach in the latter 
context, it may be argued that corporate liability for tax evasion is even more remote than that 
established under the Bribery Act,185 with one of the offenders being a party not once but 
twice removed from the organisation itself. Further, unlike the corporate failure to prevent 
bribery offence,186 there is no requirement to show that the individual agent facilitating the 
evasion was acting for the benefit of the corporation. The rationale for the development of the 
“failure to prevent” model of corporate liability in both contexts is said to be that it 
incentivises organisations to take reasonable steps, and put in place adequate procedures, to 
promote corporate good governance.187 Thus, mirroring the approach taken in the Bribery 
Act,188 a due diligence defence is available to corporations who have taken reasonable steps 
to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion by their associates.189 Whether or not the steps taken 
were reasonable will be a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.   
CONCLUSION 
The estimates for criminal activity by companies in areas considered to constitute economic 
crime were seen to be seriously eye-watering. However, it was apparent that even these 
figures could understate the true level of criminality depending on how certain types of 
activities, such as mis-selling or off-balance sheet finance might be recategorized. Against 
this backcloth, it was seen that the common law’s reliance on the identification principle to 
impose criminal liability was not merely an obstacle, for example, evidentially, but could 
give rise to perverse incentives for senior managers not to address questionable or dubious 
practices in large companies. The government’s desire to reform this area was, therefore, 
unsurprising, though its apparent lack of confidence in its chosen method – the “failure to 
prevent” model – and its use of the rather nebulous and history-laden terminology of 
economic crime were regrettable.  
The adoption of the new “failure to prevent” model in the context of bribery was 
unsurprising. The law on bribery had developed in relative isolation both in a national and 
international context and its historical origins showed that it had been subject to reform over 
an extended period. The “failure to prevent” model was shown not to be as novel as perhaps 
thought but insofar as there were historical precedents for such an approach, they were 
generally unsuccessful and eventually repealed. A comparison was made with attempts to 
impose criminal liability for a failure to disclose but these were seen to be quite distinct with 
a “failure to prevent” model being potentially much more onerous in requiring the 
construction of appropriate prophylactic measures. Perhaps the closest example was found in 
                                                          
185 Bribery Act 2010, s.7. 
186 Bribery Act 2007, ss. 7(1)(a) and (b). 
187 HMRC “Tackling offshore tax evasion: a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
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189 Criminal Finance Act 2017, s.45(2). 
24 
 
the Money-Laundering Regulations 2007 but on closer examination it is little more than a 
regulatory offence to ensure detailed administrative compliance and has failed to survive in 
explicit form in the 2017 Regulations.  
An important determining factor in the adoption of a failure to prevent model for bribery was 
that companies were best placed to address bribery and such a model takes advantage of this. 
The true novelty of the Bribery Act 2010 “failure to prevent” offence was indeed the creation 
of a serious corporate criminal offence that blurs the line with regulatory offences but allows 
a defence based on regulatory-type compliance, giving companies a large measure of 
discretion as to how to satisfy this. The offence has also been supported by the availability of 
DPA’s and new sentencing guidelines. Modest levels of prosecution offer different possible 
interpretations of the measure’s effectiveness – merely one conviction and three DPA’s to 
date - which may result from its non-retrospective nature and novelty, but nonetheless there 
appear grounds for cautious optimism. This is supported by the further development of the 
model in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. 
The second article in this series, “New Models of Corporate Criminality: The Problem of 
Corporate Fraud: Prevention or Cure?” will explore why the law has, in contrast, appeared 
relatively ineffective in addressing fraud. It will look, for example, at the inadequacy of the 
civil law, the ad hoc and fragmented criminal law response, and the problems of the 
regulatory approach for financial services. It will argue that the “failure to prevent” model 
can be inappropriate where there is corporate rather than individual dishonesty and where the 
parties to criminal activity may include the company itself. It explores potential alternative 
approaches and makes proposals for reform. 
